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1.	Introduction		The	United	Kingdom	referendum	on	European	Union	(EU)	membership	rolled	a	variety	of	different	issues	into	one	simple	question:	Should	we	remain	in	the	EU,	or	leave	it?	This	paper	argues	that	although	the	Leave	campaign	brought	together	radically	different	and	largely	incompatible	ideas	about	Britain’s	role	in	the	world	outside	the	EU,	the	underlying	sentiment	of	the	Brexit	vote	was	economic	protectionism.	The	European	Union,	since	the	drive	to	complete	the	Single	Market	began	in	the	mid-1980s,	has	become,	more	than	a	political	union,	a	market	system	(Jabko,	2006)	in	which	the	interests	of	capital	predominate	(Blyth,	2013;	Streeck,	2016).	The	United	Kingdom	(UK),	as	a	liberal	market	economy	which	has	consistently	promoted	this	pro-market	vision	of	the	EU,	has	exposed	its	citizens	more	than	most	other	member	states	to	the	upheavals	this	process	of	marketisation	has	generated.		The	article	will	argue	that	this	protectionist	response	can	be	best	understood	as	part	of	what	Karl	Polanyi	(1944)	described	as	a	‘double	movement’:	the	imposition	of	the	market	logic	in	ever	more	areas	of	social	life,	followed	by	a	protective	counter-movement	to	subordinate	the	market	to	political	constraints.	In	this	sense,	Brexit	is	the	lagged	consequence	of	the	process	of	liberalisation	and	marketisation	the	British	economy	has	undergone	since	the	1980s,	catalysed	by	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis	of	the	late	2000s,	which	were	particularly	severe	for	the	UK	(Pettifor,	2017).	In	other	words,	notwithstanding	the	many	cultural	and	constitutional	issues	at	play,	Brexit	is	fundamentally	an	economic	phenomenon,	part	of	a	broad	revolt	against	market	liberalisation	that	has	broken	up	an	what	appeared	to	be	an	unshakeable	pro-market	consensus	in	British	politics.		As	in	other	countries,	the	anti-system,	anti-liberal	sentiment	that	helped	Brexit	triumph	has	taken	on	a	strongly	nationalist	character,	which	is	most	clearly	on	display	in	the	UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP),	but	also	increasingly	in	the	Conservative	Party	too.	But	nationalism	is	not	the	only	possible	expression	of	social	anxiety	at	the	upheavals	wrought	by	inadequately	regulated	markets,	and	the	Brexit	vote	was	preceded	by	the	dramatic	changes	in	the	Labour	Party	with	the	election	of	Jeremy	Corbyn,	who	has	articulated	anti-market	and	anti-austerity	sentiments	on	the	left.	Whilst	Corbyn	is	a	strong	supporter	of	openness	to	migrants	and	refugees,	his	lukewarm	endorsement	of	the	Remain	campaign	showed	that	Euroskepticism	was	not	confined	to	the	nationalist	right.	This	pattern	of	opposition	to	market	liberalism	from	both	right	and	left	can	also	be	observed	in	most	other	European	countries	and	the	United	States,	and	this	article	starts	from	the	premiss	that	Brexit	is	not	a	uniquely	British	phenomenon,	but	rather	one	of	many	cases	of	anti-market	backlash	that	can	be	observed	across	the	advanced	democracies.		 The	article	proceeds	as	follows:	the	second	section	outlines	Polanyi’s	theory	of	the	double	movement,	and	the	third	shows	how	it	can	be	applied	to	the	development	of	the	British	economy	since	the	1980s.	The	fourth	section	shows	how	the	Leave	campaign	drew	on	protectionist	ideas,	and	the	fifth	section	presents	evidence	on	voting	patterns	to	show	that	these	ideas	were	effective	in	mobilising	support	for	Brexit.	The	final	section	concludes.	
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2.	Another	Great	Transformation?	The	EU	from	Single	Market	to	Monetary	
Union		It	is	well	known	that	Britain’s	four	decades	of	involvement	in	the	European	Community/Union	were	that	of	an	‘awkward	partner’	(George,	1994),	and	the	British	public	always	lacked	the	instinctive	support	for,	or	at	least	acquiescence	in,	the	European	project	that	characterise	most	of	the	other	EU15	states,	particularly	those	in	continental	and	Southern	Europe.	Britain’s	choice	to	depart	the	European	Union	is	therefore	unexpected	but	not	entirely	surprising;	if	any	country	was	likely	to	leave	the	EU,	most	would	agree	it	was	the	UK.		 That	said,	Britain	is	far	from	the	only	country	to	have	significant	anti-European	political	movements	and	popular	opposition	to	European	integration.	Indeed	hostility	to	Europe,	and	in	particular	the	euro,	has	been	a	common	factor	in	the	disparate	array	of	populist	and	anti-system	movements	that	have	exploited	the	tensions	arising	out	of	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	and	the	Great	Recession	that	followed	it.	The	populist	right	in	Finland,	France,	the	Netherlands,	Austria,	Germany,	Italy,	Poland,	and	Hungary	all	express	skepticism	if	not	downright	hostility	to	the	EU.	On	the	anti-system	left	parties	such	as	Syriza	in	Greece,	Podemos	in	Spain,	the	Bloco	de	Esquerda	in	Portugal	and	Melenchon’s	France	Insoumise	have	all	articulated,	if	not	outright	Euroscepticism,	at	the	very	least	hostility	to	current	European	economic	governance.			 So	there	are	strong	grounds	for	interpreting	the	Brexit	vote	as	just	one,	albeit	very	dramatic,	example	of	a	broader	trend:	the	growing	strength	of	economic	nationalism	(Clift	and	Woll,	2013)	in	a	wide	variety	of	European	countries,	which	has	been	brewing	for	some	time	and	which	has	accelerated	with	the	economic	failures	of	the	last	decade.	British	Euroscepticism	rails	against	the	transfer	of	powers	from	the	national	to	the	supranational	level,	but	it	also	reflects	the	loss	of	political	control	over	the	economy	more	broadly,	as	governments	forego	the	right	to	intervene	to	protect	their	societies	from	market	forces.	Brexit,	alongside	similar	populist	and	protest	movements	in	other	EU	member	states,	can	be	interpreted	as	a	political	response	to	the	increasing	marketisation	of	British	and	European	economic	life.	This	article	draws	on	Polanyi’s	concept	of	the	double	movement	to	theorise	these	dynamics.	Polanyi’s	epic	work	The	Great	Transformation	described	the	emergence	of	modern	capitalism	in	19th	and	20th	century	Europe	as	a	process	of	‘commodification’,	through	which	the	market	logic	of	exchange	permeated	social	life	and	traditional	institutions	inconsistent	with	this	logic	were	swept	away.	This	was	particularly	noticeable	in	the	labour	market,	with	the	cash	nexus	determining	people’s	ability	to	survive	materially	in	a	way	which	was	unprecedented	in	human	history,	and	the	financial	market,	where	the	value	of	money	was	taken	as	overriding	other	social	needs.	Polanyi	described	this	process	as	a	‘disembedding’	of	the	economy	from	social	life,	which	brought	not	only	material	deprivation	and	economic	insecurity	but	also	social	and	cultural	distress	as	communities	and	places	were	transformed	or	even	destroyed	in	the	name	of	economic	progress.	Polanyi	argued	that	the	social	and	cultural	havoc	wreaked	by	this	process	inevitably	generated	a	political	response,	as	those	affected	demanded	protection	from	the	hard	edges	of	the	market	and	a	‘re-embedding’	of	the	economy	in	the	
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social	fabric.	He	described	this	dialectic	as	a	double	movement,	a	battle	between	the	needs	of	production	and	social	needs,	with	the	spread	of	market	forces	contrasted	by	protective	counter	movements.	The	emergence	of	modern	welfare	states	in	the	twentieth	century	in	response	to	the	economic	crises	of	the	interwar	period	is	a	reflection	of	this	double	movement:	western	democracies	all	to	varying	degrees	adopted	extensive	‘decommodifying’	social	policies	protecting	incomes,	health	and	shelter	(Esping-Andersen,	1990).	However,	the	double	movement	could	also	take	a	more	sinister	form:	the	political	reactions	to	the	economic	distress	caused	by	market	failure	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	varied	from	the	socially	progressive	policies	adopted	by	Social	Democrats	in	Sweden	or	the	United	States,	to	the	brutal	militarism	and	nationalism	of	Italian	Fascists	and	German	Nazis	(Berman,	2006).	Can	Polanyi’s	explanatory	framework	be	applied	to	contemporary	democracies	(Fraser,	2013;	Block	and	Somers,	2014)?	The	process	of	European	integration	since	the	mid-1980s	has	mostly	been	a	process	of	market-building	(Jabko,	2006).	The	Single	European	Act	of	1986	began	a	drive	to	deepen	the	European	market	by	removing	non-tariff	barriers	to	trade,	undermining	many	of	the	subtle	institutional	impediments	to	market	competition	across	national	borders.	This	process	of	market-making	was	quite	explicitly	intended	to	end	economic	protectionism,	exposing	companies	and	workers	to	Europe-wide	market	forces.	ECJ	judgements	set	about	promoting	free	movement	of	people	by	opening	national	welfare	systems	to	other	European	member	state	citizens,	potentially	placing	public	finances	of	the	wealthier	countries	under	strain	(Liebfried	and	Pierson,	1995).	Workers	are	increasingly	participating	in	an	international	labour	market,	where	citizenship	provides	little	protection	from	competition.	The	extension	of	European	integration	to	the	monetary	and	fiscal	spheres,	with	the	creation	of	the	euro	and	the	related	constraints	on	public	deficits	and	debt,	further	restricted	the	ability	of	member	state	governments	to	cushion	citizens	from	the	downsides	of	the	market.	The	parallels	with	Polanyi’s	account	of	the	1930s	are	particularly	striking	in	the	management	of	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	in	the	eurozone	(Eichengreen,	2014).	Hostility	to	the	euro,	and	to	the	austere	interpretation	of	its	rules	adopted	after	the	financial	crisis,	are	a	feature	of	the	discourse	of	most	of	the	anti-system	and	populist	parties	that	have	emerged	in	the	eurozone.	Outside	Germany,	the	main	beneficiary	of	the	euro,	the	single	currency	has	acted	in	much	the	same	way	as	the	inter-war	Gold	Standard,	with	strict	limits	on	monetary	expansion	mandating	adjustments	through	‘internal	devaluation’	–	lower	nominal	wages	and	spending	(Blyth,	2013).	Moreover,	the	European	Commission	has	doubled	down	on	austerity	by	enforcing	strict	fiscal	discipline,	imposing	draconian	budget	cuts	on	member	states	that	requested	financial	bailouts.	Britain	of	course	did	not	join	the	euro,	and	the	devaluation	of	the	pound	after	autumn	2008	and	adoption	of	quantitative	easing	by	the	Bank	of	England	in	2009-2012	(and	again	in	2016)	provided	an	important	monetary	safety	valve	for	the	economy.	Moreover,	although	Britain	did	adopt	a	deficit	reduction	plan	which	imposed	harsh	austerity,	this	was	not	mandated	by	the	European	Commission,	but	was	a	political	choice	made	by	the	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	coalition	government	elected	by	UK	voters	in	2010.	Britain’s	economic	policy	after	the	financial	crisis	was	not	entirely	pro-cyclical,	nor	was	it	the	result	of	European	Union	pressures.	We	need	to	look	more	deeply	into	the	nature	of	the	
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British	political	economy	to	understand	how	Brexit	can	be	seen	as	a	Polanyian	counter-movement.			
3.	The	Double	Movement	in	the	UK:	Market	Fundamentalism	and	its	
Consequences		It	is	ironic	that	Britain,	under	no	less	a	Eurosceptic	icon	than	Margaret	Thatcher,	was	a	driving	force	behind	the	completion	of	the	European	Single	Market,	legislated	in	1986	thanks	to	the	efforts	of	British	Commissioner	Lord	Cockfield.	But	there	is	no	obvious	contradiction	between	Thatcher’s	liberalising	zeal	in	reforming	the	UK	economy	and	her	enthusiastic	sponsorship	of	the	Single	European	Act.	Both	were	informed	by	free	market	thinking.	The	removal	of	non-tariff	barriers	to	trade	at	the	European	level	was	consistent	with	Thatcherite	deregulation	of	financial,	product	and	labour	markets	in	the	UK,	both	being	informed	by	the	expectation	that	giving	free	rein	to	market	forces	and	the	unrestricted	operation	of	the	price	mechanism	would	deliver	substantial	economic	gains,	as	well	as	reinforcing	a	consumeristic	vision	of	individual	liberty.		 This	acceleration	of	European	economic	integration	through	market	liberalisation	took	place	in	the	midst	of	a	radical	shift	in	the	British	economy	away	from	government	interventionism,	corporatism	and	welfare	provision,	towards	a	much	more	market-oriented	regulatory	framework.	As	a	result,	the	UK,	much	more	than	other	European	member	states,	was	subject	to	a	double	dose	of	‘market	fundamentalism’	(Block	and	Somers,	2014):	the	Conservative	government’s	programme	of	privatisation	and	enthusiasm	for	contracting	out	public	services	was	compounded	by	European	level	state	aid	and	competition	rules.	Labour	market	deregulation	favouring	temporary	and	agency	work	and	easing	dismissal	rules,	and	the	various	pieces	of	legislation	curbing	trade	union	rights,	created	a	more	competitive	labour	market	in	which	workers’	bargaining	power	became	increasingly	individualised;	the	opening	up	of	the	single	market	for	labour,	through	the	various	measures	facilitating	freedom	of	movement,	potentially	exposed	British	workers	to	competitive	pressures.	Timid	efforts,	driven	by	the	Delors	Commission,	to	contrast	this	liberalising	zeal	with	European-level	standards	of	social	protection	were	successfully	resisted	by	Britain’s	Conservative	government,	which	secured	opt-outs	from	the	Social	Chapter.		 The	UK	then	was	at	the	forefront	of	the	turn	to	the	market	in	European	economic	policy.	British	workers	were	subject	to	increasing	‘commodification’,	in	that	their	rights	to	collective	bargaining	and	their	protection	from	social	risks	were	significantly	reduced,	to	a	much	greater	extent	than	in	other	Western	European	countries.	However	it	is	somewhat	paradoxical	that	the	‘counter-movement’	provoked	by	these	developments	should	take	the	form	of	Euroscepticism,	since	most	of	the	impetus	for	commodifying	reforms	came	from	within,	and	most	of	the	relevant	reforms	pre-date	the	completion	of	the	European	single	market	in	1992.	Indeed,	the	effects	of	Thatcherite	reforms	on	the	income	distribution	in	Britain	were	almost	immediate.	The	Gini	coefficient	for	disposable	income	inequality	rose	from	0.25	in	1979	to	0.34	in	1991;	measures	of	absolute	and	relative	poverty	and	wage	inequality	all	saw	dramatic	
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increases	(Gosling	and	Lemieux,	2004).	In	the	course	of	the	1980s,	Britain	became	a	much	more	unequal	society,	and	this	had	little	to	do	with	changes	at	the	European	level.		 Initially,	the	political	response	to	Thatcherism	was	contained	to	British	politics:	the	poll	tax	riots	of	1990	contributed	to	Thatcher	being	forced	out	and	replaced	by	the	more	pragmatic	John	Major,	who	adopted	a	more	welfarist	approach,	allowing	public	spending	to	rise	and	ease	the	pressures	on	the	income	distribution.	Major	was	succeeded	by	a	Labour	government	that	won	three	consecutive	elections	on	the	back	of	a	political	strategy	based	on	rebuilding	public	services	and	protecting	the	welfare	state,	albeit	within	a	pro-market	framework.	The	political	pendulum	in	Britain	swung	noticeably	away	from	Thatcher’s	market	fundamentalism	after	1990.	But	the	New	Labour	episode	failed	to	build	a	sufficiently	resilient	protective	cushion	to	shield	British	society	from	the	disastrous	financial	collapse	of	the	late	2000s.		 Labour’s	strategy	was	a	hybrid	of	a	highly	liberalised	market	economy	with	increased	redistributive	efforts	through	taxation	and	public	spending	(Hopkin	and	Wincott,	2006).	Although	the	Blair	government	developed	an	ambitious	anti-poverty	strategy,	social	transfers	for	working	age	households	were	tied	to	strict	conditionality,	and	little	was	done	to	enhance	labour	protections	or	boost	the	protective	role	of	trade	unions.	Progress	was	made	on	child	poverty	and	fiscal	policy	was	clearly	progressive	(Joyce	and	Sibieta,	2013),	but	the	weakly	regulated	labour	market	with	very	decentralized	wage	bargaining	and	high	levels	of	flexible	(ie	temporary	or	part-time	contracts)	working,	especially	for	low-skilled	workers,	meant	that	market	trends	were	pushing	strongly	in	the	other	direction.	The	Blair	government’s	decision	to	give	immediate	access	to	the	British	labour	market	to	citizens	of	the	new	2004	member	states	significantly	increased	the	supply	of	labour,	potentially	mitigating	the	effects	of	the	booming	economy	on	worker	bargaining	power.	In	any	event,	overall	levels	of	disposable	income	inequality	did	not	substantially	decline	under	Labour	(Hopkin	and	Viarengo,	2012).		 Part	of	the	reason	for	this	was	the	spectacular	growth	of	the	financial	sector,	which	had	begun	in	the	mid-1980s	with	the	Thatcher	government’s	Big	Bang	reforms,	but	which	if	anything	accelerated	under	Labour.	The	boom	in	financial	services	delivered	disproportionate	gains	to	high	income	groups	(Hopkin	and	Alexander	Shaw,	2016),	whilst	facilitating	a	credit	and	housing	boom	which	encouraged	high	levels	of	personal	debt	and	priced	many	out	of	home	ownership.	Even	while	the	economy	continued	to	grow	through	to	the	beginning	of	the	financial	crisis	in	2007,	wage	growth	for	most	workers	slowed	down	in	the	early	2000s	(Machin,	2015).	As	well	as	benefiting	higher	income	groups	disproportionately,	economic	growth	in	Britain	was	very	concentrated	in	spatial	terms,	with	London	and	the	South-East	enjoying	high	growth	rates,	and	little	progress	elsewhere	(Dorling,	2006).	Levels	of	productivity	in	much	of	post-industrial	Britain	are	similar	to	the	poorest	countries	in	the	European	Union	(Bessis,	2016).		 Even	before	the	financial	crisis,	almost	three	decades	of	market	liberal	policies	in	the	UK	had	generated	very	uneven	patterns	of	income	growth,	a	heavy	reliance	on	credit-fuelled	consumer	spending	to	generate	demand,	a	consequently	volatile	business	cycle,	and	a	large	share	of	the	workforce	with	few	qualifications,	on	low	wages	with	low	job	security	and	a	high	dependence	on	the	
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benefits	system.	The	livelihoods	of	UK	citizens	were	subject	to	the	vagaries	of	market	forces	driven	by	an	unstable	financial	system.	The	liberal	labour	market	regime	and	limited	income	support	through	the	welfare	state	meant	a	growing	‘privatisation	of	risk’:	most	people	in	the	UK	had	to	deal	with	economic	insecurity	individually,	rather	than	enjoying	a	more	collective	insurance	against	threats	such	as	unemployment,	poor	pension	provision,	and	inadequate	housing.	A	society	of	individuals	increasingly	alone	in	dealing	with	economic	difficulties	was	ill-prepared	for	a	major	downturn.	In	2008,	the	wheels	came	off	this	growth	model	(Hay,	2013)	and	the	UK	economy	suffered	its	sharpest	contraction	since	the	Great	Depression.	Although	unemployment	did	not	rise	as	much	as	many	had	expected,	the	effect	on	wages	was	catastrophic:	between	2008	and	2014	median	real	wages	fell	by	around	8-10	per	cent	(Machin,	2015),	a	worse	performance	than	any	OECD	country	other	than	Hungary,	Czech	Republic	and	Greece	(OECD,	2016).	Housing	prices,	which	had	soared	in	the	pre-crisis	area,	particularly	in	the	South-East,	fell	back,	exposing	mortgage-holders	to	the	threat	of	negative	equity	or	even	repossession.	Consumers	who	had	built	up	unsecured	debt	in	the	era	of	cheap	loans	found	banks	far	less	willing	to	extend	credit.	A	growth	model	built	on	plentiful	credit	in	which	households	were	encouraged	to	make	leveraged	bets	on	real	estate	and	make	private	provision	for	retirement,	exposed	large	numbers	of	people	to	serious	hardship,	with	limited	state	help	available.		 Moreover,	the	2010	election	ushered	in	a	period	of	fiscal	retrenchment	which	came	down	heavily	on	the	sectors	of	society	hardest	hit	by	the	financial	crisis.	The	austerity	programme	of	the	Cameron	government	made	some	significant	cuts	to	social	transfers,	albeit	protecting	pensions,	and	substantially	reduced	grants	to	local	authorities.	Public	investment	was	also	reined	in,	at	least	until	2013.	This	had	the	effect	of	weakening	the	mechanism	through	which	the	return	of	growth	to	London	and	the	South-East	could	feed	through	public	spending	to	the	rest	of	the	UK.	On	the	other	hand,	the	financial	system	responsible	for	the	crisis,	was	bailed	out	by	swift	government	action	and	spared	fundamental	reform	once	the	emergency	was	over,	with	‘arms	length’	regulation	maintained	(Froud,	Moran,	Nilsson	and	Williams,	2010).	The	banks	rescued	by	the	Brown	government	were	placed	in	the	hands	of	City	insiders,	who	continued	to	receive	generous	compensation	despite	continued	losses.	In	this	context	appeals	for	a	fundamental	change	in	how	the	British	economy	works	could	prove	effective.			
4.	Taking	Back	Control:	Brexit	as	Economic	Nationalism		The	evidence	presented	above	shows	that	market	liberal	policies	have	led	to	the	commodification	of	the	UK	workforce	and	threatened	the	social	fabric.	This	provides	a	compelling	explanation	for	the	emergence	of	a	protective	counter-movement,	but	it	remains	to	be	demonstrated	that	Brexit	constitutes	part	of	such	a	movement.		The	task	is	complicated	by	the	catch-all	and	often	deliberately	ambiguous,	and	at	times	wilfully	misleading,	nature	of	the	Leave	campaigns,	which	brought	together	different	strands	of	Euroskeptic	thinking.	However	there	are	clear	indications	in	the	referendum	campaign	that	economic	protectionism	was	a	key	part	of	the	Leave	message.	
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	 One	faction	of	the	pro-Brexit	camp	can	be	seen	as	unsympathetic	to	any	kind	of	protectionist	counter-movement.	Some	globalist	neoliberals	campaigned	for	Leave,	arguing	that	EU	membership	hindered	the	free	play	of	markets	by	imposing	unnecessary	regulations	or	because	of	the	imposition	of	common	tariff	barriers	that	restricted	trade	between	EU	member	states	and	the	rest	of	the	world	(Hannan,	2012).	Some	such	figures,	in	particular	those	associated	with	parts	of	the	financial	sector,	were	motivated	by	hostility	to	European	banking	regulation	developed	since	the	global	financial	crisis,	which	was	perceived	as	undermining	free	markets		(Mooney,	2016).	Others	drew	on	the	unconventional	view	that	‘genuine’	free	trade	could	only	be	achieved	by	leaving	the	EU	and	ridding	the	UK	of	any	tariff	barriers	to	external	trade	(Minford,	2016).	Complaints	about	EU	standards	and	rules	and	their	consequences	for	consumer	items	such	as	lightbulbs,	kettles,	and	bananas	were	a	staple	of	anti-EU	propaganda	that	drew	on	the	idea	of	regulatory	overreach.		 However,	much	of	the	rhetoric	deployed	by	the	various	Leave	campaigners	was	infused	with	protectionist	or	market-curbing	aspirations.	The	most	obvious	of	these	is	hostility	to	the	freedom	of	movement	of	people	across	EU	borders.	Concerns	about	migration	were	tied	to	the	potential	that	the	ease	with	which	non-UK	workers	could	move	to	Britain	in	search	of	work,	subjected	UK	nationals	to	higher	risks	of	unemployment	and	downward	pressure	on	wages.	Although	studies	have	tended	to	show	only	small	or	negligible	effects	of	EU	migration	on	UK	wages	and	employment	(Dustmann,	Fabbri	and	Preston,	2008;	Nickell	and	Saleheen,	2015;	Portes,	2016),	it	seems	that	for	many	Leave	voters,	migration	was	perceived	as	a	threat	to	living	standards,	and	the	Leave	campaign	sought	to	emphasise	this	at	every	opportunity.	The	proposal	to	restrict	access	to	the	UK	labour	market	to	UK	nationals,	by	constraining	free	movement	from	the	EU,	can	be	interpreted	as	a	proposal	to	curb	the	operation	of	the	price	mechanism	of	the	UK	labour	market	by	restricting	supply,	a	clearly	protectionist	move.		 Of	course	opposition	to	freedom	of	movement	was	not	based	solely	an	economic	concerns,	but	also	contained	a	strong	cultural	component,	especially	amongst	older	voters	who	are	less	threatened	by	the	labour	market	consequences	of	migration.	In	areas	of	previously	very	low	migration,	such	as	rural	areas	in	the	East	of	England,	the	big	increases	in	the	Eastern	European	population	appear	to	have	motivated	high	shares	for	Leave	(see	Goodwin	and	Milazzo,	2017).	This	is	also	consistent	with	Polanyi’s	double	movement	thesis,	with	the	broader	social	upheavals	to	‘habitation’	(place	and	community)	a	major	source	of	the	distress	wrought	by	labour	commodification.	Again,	demands	for	restrictions	on	migration	constitute	demands	for	regulation	of	the	labour	market	to	restrict	supply	and	protect	not	only	wages	but	communities	from	the	perceived	threat	of	outsiders.	The	strand	of	the	Leave	campaign	close	to	UKIP	sought	to	connect	fears	of	uncontrolled	immigration	in	general	relating	to	the	Syrian	refugee	crisis	with	EU	freedom	of	movement,	as	in	the	infamous	‘Breaking	Point’	poster	unveiled	by	Nigel	Farage.		A	further	plank	of	discontent	was	the	strain	placed	on	public	services	by	sudden	rapid	increases	in	the	population	in	some	areas	where	migration	increased	quickly.	Pressure	on	housing,	education	and	health	services	purportedly	resulting	from	immigration	was	frequently	invoked	in	Leave	propaganda.	This	pressure	stemmed	at	least	in	part	from	the	austerity	measures	
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inherent	in	the	government’s	deficit	reduction	programme,	and	until	the	referendum	campaign	Cameron	had	avoided	challenging	claims	that	migration,	rather	than	government	cuts,	was	to	blame.	Indeed,	immediately	after	winning	the	2015	election,	the	Prime	Minister	dedicated	a	speech	to	EU	immigration,	arguing	that	‘under	the	free	movement	rules,	national	welfare	systems	can	provide	an	unintended	additional	incentive	for	large	migratory	movements…Changes	to	welfare	to	cut	EU	migration	will	be	an	absolute	requirement	in	the	renegotiation’	(Cameron,	2015).	The	evidence	in	fact	showed	that	migration	from	the	2004	enlargement	countries	was	particularly	fiscally	positive,	whilst	non-EU	migration	was	a	net	negative	(Dustmann	and	Frattini,	2014).		By	accepting	the	fiscal	case	for	cutting	migration,	Cameron	opened	the	door	for	Leave	campaigners	to	exploit	popular	anger	at	austerity	to	mobilise	support	for	Brexit,	by	tying	the	failures	of	the	government’s	deficit	reduction	plan	to	EU	membership.	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	governments	since	2010	had	been	aided	by	immigration	in	their	attempts	to	repair	the	damage	to	Britain’s	public	finance	resulting	from	the	financial	crisis,	the	Conservatives	had	adopted	the	contradictory	stance	of	committing	themselves	to	a	reduction	in	net	migration.	As	a	result,	pro-Remain	voices	in	the	government	were	hindered	in	their	ability	to	defend	intra-EU	labour	flows	as	beneficial	for	the	economy,	whilst	Leave	campaigners,	and	in	particular	the	right-wing	press,	consistently	attacked	immigration	as	a	source	of	economic	strain.	Migrants	were	blamed	for	shortages	of	school	places	(Patel,	2016),	a	problem	aggravated	by	the	coalition’s	decision	to	scrap	the	Migrant	Impact	Fund	established	by	the	previous	Labour	government.	Similarly,	pressure	on	the	NHS	was	blamed	on	the	scale	of	migration	(Gove,	Johnson	and	Stuart,	2016),	and	most	notoriously,	several	leading	Leave	figures,	including	leading	Conservatives	Gove,	Duncan	Smith	and	Johnson,	associated	themselves	with	the	misleading	claim	that	EU	membership	cost	Britain	£350	million,	money	that	they	argued	could	be	spent	plugging	gaps	in	the	NHS	budget.	We	can	see	that	the	Brexit	campaign	was	able	to	mobilise	grievances	surrounding	the	visible	failures	of	liberalisation	of	the	labour	market	and	the	fiscal	consequences	of	the	inadequately	regulated	financial	system	to	EU	membership.	Although	there	was	no	real	evidence	that	EU	membership	was	to	blame	in	any	direct	way	for	these	failures,	the	weakness	of	the	Labour	opposition	meant	that	there	was	no	strong	progressive	argument	for	addressing	austerity	and	insecurity	through	social	democracy,	rather	than	economic	nationalism.	The	Labour	party	had	spent	two	decades	freeing	itself	of	a	reputation	for	economic	interventionism,	and	had	embraced	free	markets,	economic	openness	and	enthusiastic	participation	in	the	European	project	in	the	period	before	the	financial	crisis,	leaving	it	with	little	credibility	to	suggest	an	alternative	economic	model.	Similarly	the	Liberal	Democrats,	the	most	openly	pro-European	party,	were	held	back	by	their	involvement	in	the	coalition	government	that	had	opted	for	austerity	under	Cameron.	The	key	beneficiaries	of	this	situation	were	UKIP	and	the	Eurosceptic	right	of	the	Conservative	Party,	who	could	present	themselves	as	offering	the	only	viable	alternative	to	austerity,	insecurity	and	cultural	threat.		 The	referendum	campaign	was	not	limited	to	economic	issues,	and	the	Leave	campaigns	also	emphasised	ideas	of	national	sovereignty	and	democracy,	and	the	problems	they	associated	with	the	UK	having	to	apply	EU	rules,	and	
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accept	the	supremacy	of	EU	law	and	the	rulings	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice.	The	slogan	‘Take	Back	Control’	invoked	the	promise	of	the	UK	regaining	the	ability	to	take	decisions	and	pass	laws	on	matters	of	concern	without	interference	from	supranational	institutions.	The	Vote	Leave	website	argued:	‘Because	EU	law	is	supreme	over	UK	law	we	cannot	scrap	any	(EU)	rules…This	loss	of	control	is	deeply	damaging	and	undemocratic.	Elections	should	be	about	the	public	choosing	who	makes	the	laws.	Instead,	all	our	politicians	have	to	do	what	the	EU	says	-	not	what	we	say’	(Vote	Leave,	2016).	The	sovereignty	argument	is	not	necessarily	a	protectionist	one,	and	indeed	many	prominent	Leave	campaigners	linked	Brexit	to	greater	economic	openness,	although	usually	in	terms	of	trade	in	goods,	rather	than	the	kinds	of	service	industries	that	would	imply	more	open	borders.	In	this	sense,	the	demand	for	national	sovereignty	can	be	seen	more	broadly	as	a	demand	for	the	reconstitution	of	a	democratic	political	sphere	capable	of	‘taking	back	control’	of	a	series	of	policy	decisions	that	have	been	‘outsourced’	to	supranational	institutions	or	national-level	technocratic	agencies,	and	removed	from	everyday	political	debate	(Mair,	2013).	The	workings	of	the	EU	have	been	subject	to	a	long-running	debate	about	its	‘democratic	deficit’	(see	Follesdal	and	Hix,	2006),		Most	of	the	relevant	areas	subject	to	this	trend	relate	to	the	economy,	both	macroeconomic	tools	such	as	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	and	microeconomic	issues	of	market	regulation.	In	a	global	economy	increasingly	internationalised	and	governed	by	rules	set	at	the	supranational	level,	it	appears	that	economic	policy	escapes	any	form	of	accountable	political	authority	whatsoever	(Blyth,	2003).	The	EU	is	of	course	perhaps	the	clearest	example	of	this,	as	the	UK	and	the	other	member	states	bind	themselves	to	shared	rules,	rules	mostly	informed	by	a	pro-market	vision	which	restricts	the	ability	of	democratically	elected	sovereign	governments	to	intervene	with	market	dynamics.	This	trend	towards	the	‘regulatory	state’	(Majone,	1994)	was	targeted	by	the	Leave	campaign,	not	only	in	its	opposition	to	the	supremacy	of	EU	law,	but	also	in	invoking	hostility	to	unelected	‘experts’,	such	as	Treasury	and	Bank	of	England	officials	who	argued	that	Brexit	would	have	nefarious	consequences	for	the	British	economy	(Mance,	2016).	Whilst	this	demand	for	national	sovereignty	was	not	necessarily	protectionist,	it	was	a	necessary	condition	for	economic	protectionism	to	be	achieved,	and	the	Leave	campaign’s	emphasis	on	immigration	and	the	inability	to	control	it	inside	the	EU	illustrates	a	clear	link	between	national	policy	autonomy,	democracy,	and	protection	from	the	market.	The	EU’s	firm	application	of	the	principle	of	free	movement	of	people	has	been	the	most	glaring	example	and	the	one	most	visible	to	British	voters,	but	similar	arguments	could	be	presented	for	the	other	three	freedoms	too.	The	UK	government	would	not	be	able	to	protect	British	goods	and	services	from	the	competitive	Europe-wide	market	even	if	it	wished	to,	due	to	state	aid	rules	and	regulatory	convergence.	These	competitive	pressures	have	led	to	weaker	companies	failing,	and	can	be	seen	as	driving	a	race	to	the	bottom	in	social	provision	and	labour	market	regulation	in	an	attempt	to	maintain	competitiveness.	Similarly,	freedom	of	movement	of	capital	has	exposed	Britain	to	financial	volatility	and	fuelled	part	of	the	housing	boom	which	has	destabilized	the	household	economy	of	British	families.	The	minority	‘Lexit’	strand	of	pro-Leave	thinking	emphasised	these	arguments.	The	exposure	of	British	society	to	market	forces	has	been	driven	
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predominantly	by	decisions	taken	by	successive	British	governments,	and	European	integration	has	been	reconciled	with	high	levels	of	social	protection	elsewhere	in	the	EU.	However	the	feeling	of	‘loss	of	control’	that	was	expertly	exploited	by	the	Leave	campaign	can	be	seen	as	the	consequence	of	a	quarter-century	long	process	of	liberalisation	driven	by	both	British	politicians	and	the	forces	of	economic	internationalisation	and	European	political	cooperation.	The	demand	to	‘take	back	control’	is	in	part	a	demand	for	protection	from	a	globalized	market	economy,	and	a	plea	to	re-embed	the	market	in	the	national	social	fabric.		
5.	Support	for	Brexit:	A	Vote	Against	the	Market?		Having	shown	how	the	main	messages	of	the	Leave	campaign	were	consistent	with	protectionist	and	anti-market	thinking,	it	still	remains	to	be	demonstrated	that	Brexit	won	support	on	this	basis.	This	section	will	assess	the	electoral	and	political	characteristics	of	the	Brexit	vote	with	a	view	to	showing	how	they	reflect	unease	at	the	incursion	of	market	dynamics	into	social	life.	This	unease	was	a	product	both	of	material	economic	distress	and	the	more	cultural	and	social	upheavals	related	to	migratory	movements	as	the	UK	labour	market	recruited	large	numbers	of	workers	from	other	EU	member	states.			 The	most	straightforward	reason	for	seeing	Brexit	as	articulating	an	anti-market	counter-movement	is	its	appeal	to	lower	income,	less	educated	voters	in	poorer	areas	of	the	UK.	This	‘left	behind’	thesis	(Ford	and	Goodwin,	2014)	holds	that	support	for	UKIP	in	recent	elections	is	driven	largely	by	older,	less	educated,	working	class	men	who	are	generally	losers	from	economic	change	and	feel	threatened	or	irritated	by	cultural	changes	brought	by	immigration	and	the	rise	of	liberal	cultural	values.	The	available	evidence	on	the	2016	referendum	voters	suggests	these	same	characteristics	were	also	predictors	of	the	Leave	vote,	suggesting	that	economic	hardship	was	driving	the	result.	Leave	voting	decreased	with	income,	and	also	with	educational	qualifications,	both	of	which	are	indicators	of	individual	exposure	to	economic	risks	(Clarke,	Goodwin	and	Whiteley,	2017).	As	Goodwin	and	Heath	(2016)	summarized,	vulnerability	to	poverty,	unemployment,	low	skills,	and	perceptions	that	one’s	financial	situation	had	deteriorated	over	the	recent	period	were	all	strong	predictors	of	the	Leave	vote,	a	patterns	consistent	with	the	double	movement	hypothesis.		The	importance	of	economic	distress	can	also	be	seen	in	the	geography	of	the	vote.	Outside	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland,	Remain	polled	comfortable	majorities	only	in	London	and	prosperous	smaller	cities	such	as	Oxford,	Cambridge,	or	Brighton,	usually	with	higher	incomes	and	much	higher	shares	of	university	graduates	than	the	UK	average	(Goodwin	and	Heath,	2016).	In	contrast,	very	high	shares	of	Leave	votes	were	found	predominantly	in	poorer,	former	manufacturing	areas	of	England	and	Wales.	Colantone	and	Stanig	(2016)	find	that	Leave	voting	was	higher	in	areas	most	exposed	to	heightened	global	economic	competition.	The	effects	of	long-term	economic	decline	were	compounded	by	the	short-term	consequences	of	fiscal	austerity.	Labour’s	expansion	of	public	spending	up	to	the	crisis	had	mitigated	the	effects	of	the	decline	of	manufacturing,	but	harsh	constraints	on	public	spending	on	social	protection	after	2010	had	their	greatest	effect	in	those	areas.	The	Leave	vote	was	strongest	in	regions	which	suffered	the	greatest	spending	cuts	(Harrop	2016,	
 11	
Becker,	Fetzer	and	Novy	2016).	The	three	areas	with	strong	support	for	Remain	-	London,	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	–	are	all	territories	with	devolved	administrations	and	favourable	public	spending	arrangements	(Phillips,	2014),	leading	to	an	attenuated	impact	of	austerity	measures	(although	the	Remain	vote	in	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	was	clearly	also	linked	to	identity	and	constitutional	concerns).			 Age	was	also	a	strong	predictor	of	the	Leave	vote.	Tangled	up	with	the	other	key	variables	of	education,	which	declines	with	age	cohort	in	the	UK,	and	also	to	some	extent	income	(pensioners	having	lower	income	than	prime	working	age	citizens),	age	appears	to	have	an	independent	effect.	This	has	been	interpreted	as	a	sign	of	a	cultural	backlash	against	globalisation,	increasing	immigration,	and	rapid	shifts	in	cultural	norms	(authoritarian	views	on	issue	such	as	family	life	and	the	death	penalty	are	strong	predictors	of	the	Leave	vote	[Kaufmann,	2016,	Inglehart	and	Norris	2016]).	The	younger	cohort	voted	decisively	to	Remain,	despite	facing	much	greater	economic	insecurity,	at	least	in	the	short	term,	than	the	older	population.	The	strong	Leave	vote	amongst	pensioners,	whose	incomes	have	risen	more	quickly	than	the	working	age	population	since	the	financial	crisis,	could	suggest	that	for	many	voters	the	cultural	ramifications	of	rapid	shifts	in	population	driven	by	labour	market	trends	were	as	important	as	material	economic	factors.	However	older	voters	are	also	disproportionately	dependent	on	public	spending	on	pensions,	health	and	social	care,	and	were	therefore	directly	affected	by	austerity,	particularly	in	its	effects	on	public	services.	The	predominance	of	older	voters	in	the	Leave	camp,	alongside	the	clear	evidence	of	public	disquiet	over	immigration,	has	led	some	scholars	to	dismiss	the	economic	motivations	for	Brexit	in	favour	of	a	more	cultural	explanation.	As	the	NatCen	report	into	the	vote	described,	‘the	Leave	victory	was	not	about	demographics	alone…	matters	of	identity	were	equally,	if	not	more	strongly	associated	with	the	Leave	vote	–	particularly	feelings	of	national	identity	and	sense	of	change	in	Britain	over	time’	(Swales,	2016).	Clearly	immigration	was	a	touchstone	issue,	and	high	levels	of	concern	about	immigration	since	the	mid-2000s	clearly	fuelled	the	pressure	for	a	referendum,	and	contributed	to	the	Leave’s	success.	NatCen’s	data	showed	that	immigration	was	the	second	most	important	issue	for	voters	after	the	economy	(Swales,	2016:	13),	and	Clarke,	Goodwin	and	Whiteley’s	(2017)	analysis	suggested	attitudes	towards	immigration	were	important	predictors	of	the	Leave	vote.	Moreover,	although	Leave-voting	areas	on	average	had	low	shares	of	migrants	in	the	population	than	Remain-voting	areas,	the	rate	of	increase	of	immigration	was	a	predictor	of	Leave	vote	(Goodwin	and	Milazzo,	2017).		Economics	and	identity	are	often	presented	as	opposing	hypotheses	in	the	debate	on	the	rise	of	populism	(Norris	and	Inglehart,	2016;	Curtice,	2016).	This	analytical	distinction	is	misleading:	the	political	economy	of	the	post-crisis	period	in	the	UK	brought	together	wage	stagnation,	reductions	in	social	expenditure,	greater	economic	security	and	high	levels	of	migration	as	part	of	the	same	process	of	economic	adjustment.	These	different	factors	can	be	separated	analytically	and	measured	through	separate	survey	questions,	but	the	surveys	do	not	tell	us	whether	voter	concerns	about	immigration	were	driven	by	predominantly	cultural	or	economic	motives.	Hobolt	(2016)	shows	that	whilst	economic	risks	were	an	important	motivation	for	the	Remain	vote,	Leave	voters	
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justified	their	choice	in	terms	of	immigration	and	sovereignty.	The	socio-demographic	characteristics	of	Leave	voters	are	clearly	related	to	their	social	attitudes	–	a	preference	for	cultural	homogeneity	and	traditional	values	correlate	with	low	levels	of	education	and	therefore	exposure	to	the	sharp	end	of	labour	market	competition	with	migrants,	although	the	real	measurable	effects	of	this	competition	appear	small.	We	can	conclude	that	the	dramatic	changes	brought	by	globalisation	and	European	integration,	the	extension	of	market	relationships	to	new	areas	of	social	life,	and	the	acute	shock	to	material	living	standards	resulting	from	the	financial	crisis,	produced	a	powerful	political	counter-movement.	The	Brexit	vote	displays	the	characteristics	of	a	protest	against	the	social,	economic	and	cultural	consequences	of	a	long	process	of	marketisation	of	the	British	economy,	which	reached	its	own	‘breaking	point’	after	the	financial	crisis.				
6.	Conclusions		This	article	has	presented	the	vote	for	Brexit	as	an	expression	of	an	anti-market	‘counter-movement’,	drawing	on	Karl	Polanyi’s	account	of	the	double	movement	of	market	liberalization	and	anti-market	political	movements	in	the	nineteenth	and	first	half	of	the	twentieth	centuries.	I	have	argued	that	the	wave	of	pro-market	policy	since	the	1980s,	both	at	the	UK	level	and	supranationally	through	the	EU,	has	generated	a	political	reaction,	catalysed	by	the	2008	global	financial	crisis	and	resulting	austerity.	Interpretation	of	the	key	messages	of	the	Leave	campaign	and	the	characteristics	of	the	most	likely	Brexit	voters	confirms	that	the	project	of	leaving	the	EU	was	in	large	part	a	protectionist	one,	and	that	exposure	to	the	hard	edges	of	the	market	reforms	of	the	past	decades	was	a	strong	predictor	of	openness	to	this	project.		The	vote	for	Brexit	is	not	an	isolated	event,	but	part	of	a	wave	of	populist,	anti-elite	revolts:	a	new	‘anti-system’	politics	Western	democracies	are	experiencing,	shaking	the	existing	consensus	around	economic	integration,	free	markets	and	liberal	values.	This	wave	takes	a	variety	of	forms,	but	has	in	common	a	robust,	even	violent,	rejection	of	the	mainstream	political	elites	and	their	values,	and	a	demand	for	governments	to	act	on	the	sources	of	social	and	economic	distress	and	inequality.	This	article	views	Brexit	as	a	part	of	a	new	anti-system	politics,	a	reaction	to	the	increasing	impotence	of	established	political	elites	to	address	the	upheavals	wrought	by	global	market	capitalism.	This	reaction	has	become	particularly	acute	since	the	financial	crisis	of	the	late	2000s,	which	affected	Britain	disproportionately,	and	the	failure	of	austerity	policies	to	revive	growth,	crystallising	the	ineffectiveness	of	existing	policies	to	deal	with	economic	stagnation.		This	policy	failure	is	compounded	by	a	perceived	refusal	of	politicians	to	engage	with	the	broader	public,	and	a	lack	of	real	choice	between	the	mainstream	political	parties.		What	is	especially	striking	about	the	referendum	and	its	aftermath	is	that	the	UK	appears	to	be	a	country	viscerally	divided	on	fundamental	issues	of	economic	organisation,	international	relations	and	even	the	very	survival	of	the	UK	state	itself.	Yet	politics	since	the	early	1990s	had	revolved	around	a	broad	consensus	of	the	main	political	parties	on	all	these	issues,	a	consensus	which	is	now	falling	apart	in	the	face	of	the	evidence	of	
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intense	political	polarization	in	the	population.	Brexit	expresses	one	side	of	this	divide,	but	the	spectacular	growth	of	Scottish	nationalism	and	the	radicalisation	of	the	Labour	party	also	express	deep-seated	discontent	at	how	Britain	is	currently	governed.	The	liberal,	pro-market	consensus	of	the	1990s	and	2000s	is	now	a	minority	position,	besieged	by	the	demands	of	social	forces	of	both	left	and	right	for	protection	from	uncontrolled	markets.	This	scenario	would	not	have	surprised	Karl	Polanyi.		 									
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